Holding back the waves? sea level rise and maritime claims by Schofield, Clive
University of Wollongong 
Research Online 
Faculty of Law, Humanities and the Arts - 
Papers Faculty of Arts, Social Sciences & Humanities 
1-1-2013 
Holding back the waves? sea level rise and maritime claims 
Clive Schofield 
University of Wollongong, clives@uow.edu.au 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ro.uow.edu.au/lhapapers 
 Part of the Arts and Humanities Commons, and the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Schofield, Clive, "Holding back the waves? sea level rise and maritime claims" (2013). Faculty of Law, 
Humanities and the Arts - Papers. 1234. 
https://ro.uow.edu.au/lhapapers/1234 
Research Online is the open access institutional repository for the University of Wollongong. For further information 
contact the UOW Library: research-pubs@uow.edu.au 
Holding back the waves? sea level rise and maritime claims 
Abstract 
Sea level rise has the potential to influence the location of baselines along the coast from which claims to 
maritime jurisdiction are made. Accordingly, sea level rise may have adverse impacts on the extent of 
national maritime claims. This article provides a brief discussion of sea level rise before exploring the link 
between potentially variable baselines and the outer limits to maritime claims. Options to address these 
challenges are then discussed. 
Keywords 
maritime, rise, level, claims, sea, holding, waves, back 
Disciplines 
Arts and Humanities | Law 
Publication Details 
C. Schofield, 'Holding back the waves? sea level rise and maritime claims' in O. C. Ruppel, C. Roschmann 
and K. Ruppel-Schlichting(ed), Climate Change: International Law and Global Governance: Legal 
Responses and Global Responsibility Vol.1 (2013) 593-614. 
This book chapter is available at Research Online: https://ro.uow.edu.au/lhapapers/1234 
Holding Back the Waves? Sea-level Rise and Maritime Claims∗  
 
Clive Schofield 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Sea level rise has the potential to influence the location of baselines along the coast from 
which claims to maritime jurisdiction are made. Accordingly, sea level rise may have adverse 
impacts on the extent of national maritime claims. This article provides a brief discussion of 
sea level rise before exploring the link between potentially variable baselines and the outer 
limits to maritime claims. Options to address these challenges are then discussed. 
 
 
 
A.      Introduction 
 
Among the multiple threats posed by the impacts of climate change on the oceans is sea-level 
rise. This is likely to be especially problematic if the rise in sea level is significant and 
critically rapid. Sea-level rise of this nature would inevitably present disastrous threats to 
numerous coastal states. This is especially the case given that longstanding trends in global 
population movements from interior and predominantly highland locations to lowland and 
frequently coastal contexts have led to heavy urbanisation in low-lying coastal areas. Indeed, 
it has been estimated that a sea-level rise of 1 metre would inundate territory which is 
presently home to around 60 million people.1 Moreover, some particularly low-lying coastal 
areas such as the mega-deltas of the world, including those of Vietnam’s Mekong and Red 
Rivers in the Asia-Pacific, are likely to be particularly susceptible to the threat of inundation, 
as large areas are actually below mean sea level at present sea levels.2  For instance, it has 
been estimated that the aforementioned 1 metre rise in sea level could displace more than 7 
million inhabitants in the Mekong delta area alone.3 Further, even if not permanently 
inundated, climate change and sea-level rise are likely to make low-lying coastal areas more 
vulnerable to periodic flooding as a consequence of an increasing incidence of extreme 
weather events, leading, for instance, to storm surges occurring on top of an elevated base sea 
level.4 In addition to threats to populated coastal areas, concerns have been raised over the 
potential impacts of increased salt water intrusion on agricultural land close to the coast, as 
 
 
∗  This  chapter  draws  heavily  on  the  author’s  earlier  contributions,  particularly:  Schofield  &  Arsana 
(2012); Schofield (2011); Schofield (2009). 
1 See, for example, Ananthaswamy (2009:26, 30). 
2 Doyle et al. (2010). 
3 UNDP (2011). 
4 Gornitz (1995:529). 
well as valuable coastal environments and habitats such as wetlands and mangroves, as a 
consequence of sea-level rise.5 
 
Perhaps, inevitably, these threats to land territory and the populations, infrastructure and 
property associated with the loss of these areas have tended to dominate the concerns of 
policy makers in this context. There is, however, a further significant potential threat to the 
spatial extent of coastal states, a threat with respect to offshore rather than territorial spaces, 
and that is that sea-level rise will lead to the retreat of territorial sea baselines inland, leading 
to significant reductions in the scope of national claims to maritime jurisdiction. This chapter 
focuses on the potential threat that sea-level rise poses to national maritime claims and 
suggests potential options to address the challenges that arise. 
 
 
 
B.      Sea-Level Rise 
 
While an in-depth discussion of sea-level rise is beyond the scope of this chapter, it is worth 
observing that there is broad agreement in the scientific community that sea levels are rising 
and doing so at an increasing rate.6  What remains uncertain are the critical issues of the 
degree  to  which  the  sea  will  rise  and  how  swiftly  it  will  do  so.  In  large  part,  these 
uncertainties stem from the multitude of complex factors that may contribute to sea-level rise 
(and fall) and the interplay between them. 
 
For example, although the melting of glaciers and other grounded ice are well known and 
potentially very significant contributors to sea-level rise, the extent and speed of their melting 
remains highly debatable. The possibility of the melting of major land-based ice sheets, 
resulting in massive and abrupt sea-level rise has been described as one of the major climate 
“wild cards”.7 Indeed, even relatively moderate melting of such huge ice sheets as a result of 
climate change would have profound impacts on global sea level. However, as a consequence 
of the considerable uncertainty that surrounds the issues of whether and how swiftly land- 
based ice sheets such as  those  of  Antarctica and  Greenland are melting, the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) did not factor in this possible loss of ice. 
This led to its relatively moderate predictions in the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report of 2007. 
Consequently, the IPCC’s estimates of the range of sea-level rise by 2100 of between 0.18 
and 0.59 metres above 1990 levels, with a mid-range prediction of 40 centimetres,8 have been 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 Freestone (1991:119–122). 
6 See, generally, Schofield (2011). 
7 See Walker & King (2008:75–80). 
8 IPCC (2007:36–41). 
criticised as being “remarkably conservative” and as being the victim of reaching “lowest 
common-denominator conclusions”.9 
 
It has also been recognised that sea-level rise is a phenomenon that exhibits marked spatial 
and temporal variability. The diverse range of factors that can influence sea levels across a 
range of scales tends to lead to significant uncertainties over measurements and the causes of 
sea-level changes. Sea level varies diurnally, under the influence of the tides, but also 
seasonally, regionally and inter-annually. Further, intricate atmospheric-oceanic interactions 
can result in significant regional variations in sea level spanning multiple years. The sea-level 
rise ‘signal’ has to be set against (and distinguished from) the background of ‘noise’ of tidal 
cycles and of climatic variations, such as the El Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO). Sea level 
is also influenced by deformations of the earth’s crust, for instance through the process of 
isostatic rebound or uplift already referred to above, as well as vertical displacements 
associated with tectonic movements. Additionally, anthropogenic activities can also 
substantially influence sea-level rise, either enhancing sea-level rise, for instance through 
deforestation promoting run off of water into the oceans, or countering it, for example 
through the building of dams.10 Consequently, the IPCC concluded in its Fourth Assessment 
Report of 2007 that sea-level change is “highly non-uniform spatially”, noting that in some 
regions rates of rise are several times higher than the global mean rise, while in other regions, 
sea level is falling. 
 
Although uncertainties persist regarding the scale and rate of sea-level rise, perhaps the 
critical point in this context is that, even if only relatively moderate sea-level rise were to 
occur, such limited vertical change would nonetheless be likely to give rise to substantial 
shifts in the location of the coast horizontally where low-lying, shallow gradient coastlines 
are under consideration.11 As noted above, major population centres are concentrated on the 
coast, such that this scenario represents a potentially catastrophic scenario. This is especially 
the case for developing states with large populations located on low-lying territory, such as 
on the deltas of the Bramaputra and Mekong Rivers in Bangladesh and Vietnam respectively. 
 
 
 
C.      Ambulatory Baselines and Shifting Limits 
 
I.         Baselines and Claims to Maritime Jurisdiction 
 
The  United  Nations  Convention on  the  Law  of  the  Sea  (LOSC)  of  1982  provides the 
generally accepted legal framework governing maritime jurisdictional claims. The LOSC has 
gained widespread international recognition and,  at  the  time  of  writing,  163  states  had 
 
 
9 McKibben (2007). See also Ananthaswamy  (2006:26), who notes that there is a “growing consensus” 
that the IPCC estimates are “wildly optimistic”. 
10 On these factors, see, generally, Schofield (2011). 
11 See, for example, Leahy et al. (2001). 
become parties to it. A key achievement of the LOSC was the agreement on spatial limits to 
national claims to maritime jurisdiction. Consequently, maritime claims are predominantly 
defined as extending to a set distance from baselines along the coast. 
 
Measured seawards from its baselines, a coastal state is entitled to claim a series of zones of 
maritime jurisdiction provided for in accordance with the LOSC. These zones include a 
territorial sea of 12 nautical miles (nm) (LOSC, Article 3), a contiguous zone out to 24 nm 
from baselines (or 12 nm from territorial sea limits) (LOSC, Article 33), an exclusive 
economic zone (EEZ) out to 200 nm from baselines (LOSC, Article 57) and continental shelf 
rights that may extend up to 350 nm or even further in certain circumstances (LOSC, Article 
76).12 
 
Coastal states have multiple options with  respect to  choice of  baselines. These include 
straight baselines (LOSC, Article 7), lines closing the mouths of rivers (LOSC, Article 9) and 
the mouths of bays (LOSC, Article 10), as well as baselines related to ports (LOSC, Article 
11). Further, a state that qualifies as an archipelagic state according to Article 46 of the LOSC 
can designate archipelagic baselines “joining the outermost points of the outermost islands 
and drying reefs of the archipelago” (LOSC, Article 47). However, the predominant type of 
baselines in use globally comprise “normal” baselines which, in accordance with Article 5 of 
the LOSC, are coincident with the low water line along the coast as marked on large scale 
charts. It is also important to note that the various straight-line type baselines outlined above 
still depend on normal baselines to an extent, as they need to be anchored back to normal 
baselines. 
 
Irrespective of the type, baselines are vital in defining the outer limits of maritime zones 
claimed by a coastal state. Landwards of a coastal state’s baselines lie either its land territory, 
including the inter-tidal foreshore landwards of normal low-water line baselines, or internal 
waters. Baselines serve as the starting point from which the outer limits of maritime zones are 
measured. In addition, baselines are critical to the construction of equidistance lines between 
coastal states in the delimitation of maritime boundaries. In this context it is notable that 
equidistance lines, the construction of which necessarily depends on the use of baselines, 
have proved to be the most popular method of delimitation by far.13  Further, the approach 
adopted by international courts and tribunals in recent international cases relating to the 
delimitation of maritime boundaries has been to define a provisional boundary line based on 
 
 
 
 
12 The outer limits of the continental shelf where it extends beyond the 200 nm exclusive economic zone 
(EEZ) limits, unlike the limits of other zones that are based solely on a distance measurement, depend 
also on the geology and geomorphology  of the seabed. That is why determining the outer limit of the 
continental shelf is a more complex task than that for other zones of maritime jurisdiction. Nonetheless, 
distance measurements from baselines remain critical to this task. 
13 See, for example, Prescott & Schofield (2005). 
equidistance, and then to examine any factors that may justify a modification of the 
provisional line in order to achieve an equitable result.14 
 
 
 
II.       Dynamic Coasts 
 
It has long been recognised that parts of the coast are dynamic and can change location and 
configuration in relatively short periods. Indeed coastlines often change in a cyclical manner 
over time (alternately shifting seawards through deposition or accretion of material and then 
landwards as a result of erosion).15 Of particular note in the present context is that as the low- 
water line moves in response to sea-level rise, so the normal baselines and the maritime 
claims measured from them will shift. This is fundamentally because normal baselines are 
coincident with the “low-water line along the coast as marked on large scale charts officially 
recognised by the coastal state” (LOSC, Article 5). The location of normal baselines will 
therefore tend to move, or ‘ambulate’, over time in accordance with changes in the coast.16 
The longstanding, generally accepted implication of this phenomenon is that as the 
coast/normal baselines change, so will the maritime jurisdictional limits measured from them. 
Thus where the baseline advances (for example by the deposition of material along the coast) 
the outer limits of the maritime claims measured from that baseline will expand seawards. 
Conversely, where the normal baseline recedes (through coastal erosion) the coastal state 
may lose maritime areas as their maritime limits are pulled back. 
 
Since normal baselines are represented by the low-water line, sea level is an important issue 
in  the  definition of  normal baselines. This  is  a  particularly significant issue  as  normal 
baselines are the predominant type of baseline worldwide. Moreover, while normal low-water 
line baselines would seem most obviously susceptible to change due to sea-level rise, as 
noted above, other types of straight-line type baselines are also potentially threatened by sea- 
level rise because such baselines need anchoring to the coast, as represented by the low-water 
line. 
 
Rising sea level will predominantly lead to the retreat inland of the low-water line and thus 
the normal baseline. This can result in significant knock-on effects on the limits of maritime 
jurisdictional claims if the base-points on which the limits of such claims depend similarly 
retreat inland. This threat to the extent of national maritime jurisdictional claims is especially 
significant for coastal states such as Bangladesh and parts of India in South Asia, as well as 
Vietnam in Southeast Asia, which have large stretches of low-lying coasts. The maritime 
claims of states in possession (or even entirely composed) of low elevation islands such as 
Kiribati, the Marshall Islands and Tuvalu in the Pacific Ocean are also under threat from this 
 
 
 
14 (ibid.). 
15 See, for example, Hirst & Robertson (2004). See also, Schofield (2009:408f.). 
16 Shalowitz & Reed (2000:185). See also Prescott &Schofield (2005:100–101). 
phenomenon. Small, remote and low-lying islands can give rise to significant maritime 
jurisdictional entitlements. However sea-level rise could change the legal status of such 
insular features. For example, an island that is currently always above the water surface, even 
during high tide, may eventually disappear during high tide as a consequence of sea-level 
rise. This could lead to its reclassification from being an island, from which claims to the full 
range of maritime zones may be made under Article 121(2) of the LOSC, to one of the 
categories of insular formations from which only restricted maritime claims can be made, 
such as a rock (LOSC, Article 121(3)) or a low-tide elevation (LTE) (features that are 
exposed at low tide but are submerged at high tide) (LOSC, Article 13), or even a fully 
submerged feature that cannot be used to generate maritime claims. 
 
 
 
III.      Coasts and Zones under Threat 
 
Although, as noted, sea-level rise would seem likely to result in the retreat inland of normal 
baselines, it is important to recognise the influence of coastal complexity and variability. 
Accordingly, sea-level rise is likely to result in uneven consequences in terms of impacts on 
maritime jurisdictional claims. 
 
The gradient of the coast is a particularly important consideration in this context. Where the 
coastline is relatively steep the impact of sea-level rise will be limited in terms of shifting the 
location of baselines (and thus the maritime jurisdictional limits derived from them) 
horizontally.  Conversely,  where  the  coastline  is  gently  shelving,  even  relatively  slight 
changes in sea level vertically can result in significant shifts in the location of the low-water 
line horizontally, and this in turn can have significant impacts on the spatial extent of national 
maritime claims. 
 
It is also worth emphasising here that not all of a coastal state’s baselines contribute towards 
the construction of the outer limits of its maritime claims. Maritime limits are commonly 
constructed through the envelope of arcs method.17 Consequently only certain base-points 
along the normal baseline – essentially the outermost points along the baseline such as 
headlands and offshore islands – will be relevant to the limits of the maritime zones. In 
contrast, those parts of the baseline that are located on the inner portion of a bay, for example, 
are unlikely to contribute to the outer limit of maritime zones. Indeed, the most of the normal 
baseline is, in fact, irrelevant to the construction of the outer limits to maritime jurisdictional 
zones. 
 
While large populations occupying low-lying coastal areas on continental coasts are arguably 
the most at risk from sea-level rise, it is noticeable that the debate on the issue tends to be 
framed, even dominated, by the concerns of a number of small island states. This focus, 
 
 
 
17 Carleton & Schofield (2001:62). 
especially in the media narrative, may stem from a perception that in contrast to small low- 
lying island states, continental states have other, higher land to which displaced populations 
can retreat. Additionally the small island states are well placed readily (and arguably 
justifiably) to elicit sympathy for their apparent predicament, especially as they can argue 
convincingly that their contribution to global climate change through the emission of 
greenhouse gases has been minimal. 
 
Concerns over sea-level rise by, and on behalf of, these states have been in large part 
prompted by recognition of not only certain states’ limited land territory but also of how little 
of this is elevated above the present sea level. For example the highest point on the territory 
of the Maldives is only 2.4 m above sea level. The situation is similar in Tuvalu: Enele 
Sosene Sopoaga, former ambassador and permanent representative of the Mission of Tuvalu 
to the United Nations, suggested at the 2007 United Nations Framework Conference on 
Climate  Change  that  sea-level  rise  was  already  a  “real  emergency”  for  his  country.18 
Consequently Tuvalu has been described as being at the “front line of climate change”.19 
Analogous concerns also exist for other small relatively low-lying island states. 
 
Moreover, it has been suggested that sea-level rise could ultimately lead to certain low-lying 
island states being overwhelmed by the waves, and thus losing their status as states. Under 
international law,  codified  in  the  Montevideo Convention on  the  Rights  and  Duties  of 
States,20 states should possess a “defined territory” and a “permanent population”, as well as 
a government and the capacity to enter into international relations with other states 
(Montevideo Convention, Article 1).  The first two  of  these four  requirements could be 
directly affected by sea-level rise. However, this scenario does not appear likely, at least in 
the near term. For instance, even if sea level were to rise by 1 m, even though the 
consequences of this would undoubtedly be calamitous, no state would be completely 
inundated as it stands. That said, even relatively slight sea-level rises might have major 
impacts on island habitability, for example by impacting on the availability of potable water. 
These concerns have led to the formation of bodies, such as the Alliance of Small Islands 
States (AoSIS), mandated to address issues concerning the vulnerability of small island states 
to climate change.21 
 
While there has been mounting evidence that the effects of sea-level rise are resoundingly 
negative, it has been speculated that sea-level rise might yield unlooked for benefits in terms 
of its impact on contentious territorial and maritime disputes. In particular, multiple territorial 
and maritime disputes in the Asia-Pacific, especially in the South China Sea and East China 
 
 
18 Leake (2007). 
19 Patel (2006). 
20 See Montevideo  Convention  on the Rights and Duties of States, opened  for signature  26 December 
1933, 165 LNTS 19 (entered into force 26 December 1934), hereafter the Montevideo Convention. 
21 See AoSIS website http://www.sidsnet.org/,  last accessed 25 April 2013. 
Sea, revolve around sovereignty over small, isolated and, critically, low-lying islands. Such 
disputes, such as that concerning the Spratly Islands group in the South China Sea, which has 
proved to be a longstanding source of friction among the multiple claimant states. The small 
insular features at the centre of  these disputes may well be threatened with inundation 
through sea-level rise, potentially removing the key driver for these disputes, the territory at 
stake. 
 
The prospect of sea-level rise entirely submerging the fundamental focus of dispute, the 
islands themselves, and thus arguably resolving the conflict, represents an alluring prospect. 
Alternatively, sea-level rise might have the impact of reducing the disputed insular features to 
the status of mere rocks or low-tide elevations, thereby significantly curtailing their capacity 
to generate claims to maritime jurisdiction, and so serving to reduce or narrow the scope of 
the maritime jurisdictional dimensions of these disputes. 
 
That said, states do not give up sovereignty claims readily. An example of this is the alleged 
disappearance of a disputed island, called South Talpatty by Bangladesh or New Moore by 
India, which could be considered an inadvertent benefit of climate change. However this has 
not proved to be the case, because not only were reports of the island’s demise somewhat 
premature (it has been reported that the island still appears during very, very low-tide 
conditions, but at least one of the parties to the dispute, Bangladesh, promptly reasserted its 
sovereignty claim to the feature.22  In respect of other territorial disputes over low-lying 
islands, it remains to be seen whether or not sea-level rise will yet have a positive impact on 
longstanding contentious island sovereignty disputes such as that over the Spratly Islands in 
the South China Sea or will add merely a further layer of confusion and doubt to an already 
uncertain scenarios.23 
 
Notwithstanding mounting evidence suggesting threats to islands and coasts due to climate 
change, counter-arguments do exist. For example there is evidence that coral atolls have 
proved to be remarkably robust over long periods, including periods when sea levels were 
considerably higher than they are now. This suggests that some insular features may be able 
to adapt naturally to climate change and sea-level rise. This is underpinned by observations in 
and analysis of 27 coral atoll islands in the central Pacific Ocean, which found that the 
majority (86 per cent) of these features had either remained stable or increased in area over a 
20–60 year period despite reported sea-level rise in the central Pacific region.24 Indeed it has 
been argued that uninterrupted sediment flows are necessary to sustain the island-building 
processes that maintain the integrity of coral reef islands: “[t]he physical dynamics of 
sediment supply and transport are critical factors in the context of management of rocky and 
 
 
 
 
22 Wade (2009). 
23 Dupont (2008). 
24 Webb & Kench (2010). 
sedimentary oceanic islands.”25 Accordingly, overpopulation of small islands, coupled with 
inappropriate land uses are important factors affecting the integrity of coral island ecosystems 
and thus the continued habitability of such features. 
 
 
 
D.      Response Options 
 
Either for sea-level rise or land subsidence, it is evident that the current normal baselines are 
ambulatory, which in turn can shift maritime limits measured from them. However there is 
also a need to have jurisdictional clarity for better ocean space management and thus fixed 
maritime limits. Four main response options arise in this context: retreat (and relocation), 
defence (including efforts designed to protect the coast or stabilise baselines physically), 
preservation of the position of baselines, and fixing the outer limits of maritime zones. 
 
 
 
I.         Retreat 
 
Rather than attempting to protect the coast and stabilise its present location, one alternative 
would be to, in a sense, accept the inevitable and manage the impacts of rising sea level. This 
can be achieved through approaches that recognise increased dynamism in the coastal zone 
and thus provide for coastal development that is responsive rather than resistant to change. In 
this context “planned retreat” calls for coastal development to be removed or relocated once 
defined “setbacks” or limits for construction are encroached on through coastal erosion.26 
 
A more extreme retreat scenario envisages the abandonment of entire islands. For example, 
the Indian island of Lohachara, located in the Sundarbans region where the Ganges and 
Brahmaputra Rivers empty into the Bay of Bengal and once home to 10,000 people, was in 
2006 reported to have been evacuated because of the effects of sea-level rise, although this 
was apparently done “as a precaution”.27 Similarly, a decision was made in 2005 to relocate 
the 2,600 inhabitants of the Carteret Islands of Papua New Guinea.28 It can be anticipated that 
such responses will increasingly come to the fore if predictions regarding substantial and 
rapid sea-level rise prove to be well founded. 
 
 
 
II.       Defend 
 
There has been a long history of human effort to protect valuable parts of the coastline and 
thus, often incidentally, in stabilising portions of the baseline along the coast for maritime 
 
 
 
25 Kenchington (2009). 
26 Smith et al. (2011). 
27 Lean (2006). 
28 IOM (2009). 
jurisdictional purposes. Such efforts tend to involve the building of sea defences such as sea 
walls, groynes and wave reduction structures. Such efforts are intended to prevent or at least 
delay natural processes of erosion and abrasion.29 
 
Similarly, reclamation could also be an option for building up vulnerable coastlines. The 
Republic of Maldives has started projects to build up some of its large islands through 
reclamation to ensure that it will have more safe refuges for its population.30 For small islands 
physical intervention can serve as a means to protect insular status. The classic case is that of 
Japan’s southernmost territory, the small, isolated insular feature, Okinotorishima, around 
which Japan has constructed a 360° sea wall, vertically higher than the threatened feature 
extends above sea level.31 
 
The drawbacks of the physical approach described are that it may be environmentally 
unfriendly and that it is also frequently costly. For instance, the mentioned sea wall built for 
Okinotorishima cost in excess of US$200 million in the 1980s.32 This is certainly not a 
preferred option for less developed states like the Maldives, Tuvalu or other Small Island 
Developing States (SIDS), which appear likely to suffer most from the impact of sea-level 
rise. This is particularly the case in the context of long, narrow coral atolls.33 
 
Physical intervention may also disturb the natural equilibrium of a coast and interrupt 
sediment flows, leading to serious unintended consequences for the environment in the long 
term.34 The building of coastal defence structures can also affect ecologies on local and 
regional scales, for example by affecting the existence of species and thus changing the 
native assemblages of the surrounding areas.35 It can therefore be concluded that the physical 
intervention approach to stabilising baselines is generally costly and tends to be 
environmentally and ecologically unfriendly. In addition, physical interventions such as 
reclamation may spark legal questions concerning the validity of reclaimed coastlines to be 
used as baselines. An ecosystem-based and sustainable management approach is therefore 
strongly advocated.36 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
29 Freestone (1991); Schofield (2009). 
30 Morris (2009). 
31 See, for example, Prescott & Schofield (2005:84–85). 
32 Brown et al. (1991:84–85). 
33 Freestone (1991). 
34 Kenchington (2009). 
35 Airoldi (2005). 
36 Kenchington (2009). 
III.      Preserve 
 
The other option for stabilising baselines is to take a legal approach. This has been suggested 
as a means whereby states threatened by sea-level rise might be able to retain their maritime 
claims.37 Two major alternatives to this are fixing the normal baselines or fixing the maritime 
limits. The LOSC states that the normal baselines of coastal states are the low-water lines 
depicted on a nautical chart recognised by the coastal states. The key information in this 
LOSC article is that “a recognized nautical chart” is the legal document on which the normal 
baselines of a coastal state are declared. However, there is no clause in the article detailing 
the required technical specifications of the nautical chart. For example, the article specifies 
neither the age of the chart in question nor whether it needs to be registered or recognised by 
an international body. 
 
It has been observed in this context that the coastal state may use any chart in defining its 
normal baselines as long as the chart is officially recognised by the coastal state itself.38 
Arguably, a coastal state could therefore fix its normal baselines by recognising a chart 
showing such baselines. However, if the baselines were to subsequently move, the coastal 
state would need to produce different charts officially recognised for different purposes – that 
is, charts for illustrating baselines as well as those used for navigational purposes. For the 
latter, a nautical chart has to be regularly revised through surveys to show the most updated 
coastal environment and important objects, especially those hazardous to navigation. 
 
The potential issue with the use of specific and fixed charts showing baselines is that other 
states may not necessarily recognise the chart. This can be problematic if two states need to 
delimit maritime boundaries between them. If one state fails to recognise another state’s chart 
depicting normal baselines, the progress of the delimitation may be hampered. However, it is 
not unusual for two states to agree on the use of a particular chart for maritime delimitation, 
even though the chart may no longer depict the current coastline/baselines. A good example 
of this practice is the maritime boundary delimitation between Indonesia and Singapore in the 
Singapore Strait, signed on 10 March 2009.39 Indonesia insisted that Singapore use its normal 
baselines, as depicted in the original map of 1969, in the delimitation, and Singapore agreed 
to do so.40 To anticipate problems caused by disagreement on the use of fixed baselines 
depicted by a particular chart, coastal states can voluntarily declare their fixed normal 
baselines in the same manner as states usually declare straight or archipelagic baselines. By 
doing this, protest and disagreement from other states, usually neighbours, can be anticipated 
well in advance, before the baselines are used for maritime claims and delimitation. 
 
 
 
 
37 Soons (1990). 
38 Schofield (2009). 
39 Republic of Indonesia, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2009). 
40 Republic of Indonesia (2010). 
41 Webb & Kench (2010). 
 
The instability issue of normal baselines may also be partially overcome by the use of straight 
baselines. However, as noted above, straight baselines were not originally conceived with the 
aim of fixing baselines in response to global changes such as sea-level rise. Straight baselines 
can be used in the context of deltas and unstable coasts (LOSC, Article 7 (2)). It would, 
however, be likely to be problematic to apply such baselines along an entire coastline as a 
response to sea-level rise. Further, as noted, while straight baselines predominantly consist of 
imaginary lines, they still require turning points, which should be points somewhere at the 
interface of land and water during low tide. Such turning points anchor straight baselines to 
the coast and therefore cannot themselves ‘float’ offshore, unattached to any point on land. 
Accordingly straight baselines still require the use of base-points, the location of which 
depends on the choice of low-water line, which is characteristically unstable. This implies 
that the use of straight baselines may fix baselines in a particular location or situation, but not 
fully resolve the instability issues. Another issue with straight baselines is that states tend to 
interpret Article 7 of the LOSC liberally in designating straight baselines, since there are 
some uncertainties and ambiguities therein. Thus the straight baselines may be considered 
excessive by other states and might be contested as a result. 
 
 
 
IV.      Fix 
 
Fixing  maritime  limits  may  be  an  alternative  to  stabilising  baselines  for  dealing  with 
changing baselines due to climate change. This would mean that once maritime limits are set 
they are permanent in terms of location. Hence it would not matter whether coastlines or 
baselines shift owing to sea-level rise: maritime limits would stay where they are. Should this 
be adopted, states will not be disadvantaged if there is significant sea-level rise that shifts 
baselines closer landwards. However some states may not see this as a good option if, for 
some reason, their baselines shift further seawards. This is possible, for example, if material 
is deposited along the coast. Ironically, as noted, this appears to have occurred with reference 
to  some  Pacific  islands,  largely  as  a  result  of  the  accumulation  of  coral  debris,  land 
reclamation and the deposit of sediment.41 If coastlines or baselines shift further seawards but 
maritime limits remain fixed, this would be a less than ideal scenario for the states involved. 
However, considering the prevailing perception that sea-level rise is accelerating, threats to 
the  location  of  baselines  and  thus  the  scope  of  maritime claims  do  still  exist.  This  is 
especially the case since it is unclear whether or not the natural responses that, for example, 
coral islands have exhibited in the past in response to sea-level variability will be able to cope 
with the potentially rapid sea-level rise induced by global climate change. This may make the 
option of fixing maritime limits more attractive to island states in the Pacific that are 
vulnerable to climate change. 
42 Prescott & Schofield (2005); Symonds (2011). 
 
The limits of a coastal state’s maritime jurisdiction can be established in one of three ways. 
First, maritime claims can be generated to the full extent or distance allowed under 
international law, in the absence of analogous claims on the part of neighbouring states. 
Second, where overlapping claims to maritime jurisdiction exist, maritime boundaries may be 
delimited between neighbouring states. Third, the definition of the outer continental shelf 
limits involves a submission process to the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the 
Continental Shelf (CLCS) (see below). 
 
Provided a coastal state does not have any neighbours with an overlapping claim to a 
particular zone, it can define its maritime limits unilaterally. For example, if a coastal state 
has no neighbours within 24 nm of its baselines it can unilaterally define its territorial sea 
limits. With regard to this option, the outer limits of maritime zones are commonly defined 
using the method of envelope of arcs, outlined previously. The limits of such claims are 
generally dependent on the baselines from which these maritime claims are measured, thus 
they may move over time as baselines shift. However, it is worth noting that the use of this 
method employs only relevant base-points along baselines to generate maritime limits. 
Depending on the shape or configuration of a coastline and therefore its associated baselines, 
not every point along baselines will affect the location of maritime limits. In other words, 
while one part of the baselines may be crucial in constructing maritime limits, other parts 
may be irrelevant. However, it is generally true that baseline changes can shift maritime 
limits. 
 
The introduction of 200 nm breadth EEZs, in particular, has had a dramatic effect on the 
scope of ocean spaces becoming subject to the maritime claims of coastal states. It has been 
estimated that if every coastal state made national maritime jurisdictional claims out to 200 
nm (as is predominantly the case) these claims would encompass 43 million nm2 (147 million 
km2) of maritime space. This amounts to approximately 41 per cent of the area of the oceans 
or 29 per cent of the earth’s surface. The extent of the area subject to jurisdictional claims out 
to 200 nm is thus approximately equivalent to the area of land territory on the surface of the 
earth.42   The  inevitable  consequence  of  this  enormous  expansion  in  national  claims  to 
maritime space seawards has been a major proliferation in overlapping claims to maritime 
jurisdiction and thus potential international maritime boundaries. Indeed there is presently no 
coastal state in existence that can claim a full suite of maritime zones without overlapping 
claims. For example, to claim a full 200 nm EEZ, a coastal state must be over 400 nm from 
its nearest maritime neighbour. Thus every coastal state needs to delimit at least one maritime 
boundary. However, this situation does not affect the way the breadths of maritime zones are 
theoretically measured from baselines. 
 
Considering the geographical location of coastal states in the world and the configuration of 
their coasts, overlapping claims of maritime zones among coastal states is inevitable. As 
such,   maritime   delimitation   is   required   to   produce   maritime   boundaries.   Maritime 
delimitation among states is therefore another way for coastal states to define the limits of 
their maritime zones. While the first option is a unilateral process, maritime delimitation is a 
bilateral or multilateral process. 
 
The  process  of  maritime  boundary  delimitation  between  two  or  more  coastal  states  is 
governed by the principles and rules of public international law.43 International law explains 
how maritime boundary delimitations should be established. However maritime boundary 
delimitation is usually resolved either through negotiation among the affected parties or by 
submission of the case to a third party. This third party can be arbitrators, mediators, courts or 
tribunals, such as the International Court of Justice or the International Tribunal for the Law 
of the Sea. 
 
An overlapping EEZ and continental shelf claim exists where the distance between State A 
and State B is less than 400 nm but greater than 24 nm. If the distance between the two 
neighbouring states is less than 24 nm then their territorial seas will overlap. This illustrates 
that maritime boundary delimitation can be required for territorial sea, EEZ or continental 
shelf, depending on the distance between the states in question. In this situation the rules 
governing maritime boundary delimitation for those different zones are also different. For the 
territorial sea, for example, it is explicitly stated by the LOSC that “neither of the two 
opposite or adjacent states is entitled to extend its territorial sea beyond the median line” 
unless either State involved agrees otherwise or if “historic title or other special 
circumstances” exist (LOSC, Article 15). A median line or equidistance line can be defined 
as “a line every point of which is equidistant from the nearest points on the territorial sea 
baselines of two states.”44  However, the LOSC does not specifically mention methods for 
delimiting EEZ and continental shelf boundaries in case overlapping claims between two or 
more states are identified. Instead, the relevant provisions of the LOSC only mention that 
continental shelf and EEZ boundaries between states with opposite or adjacent coast should 
be established to “achieve an equitable solution” (LOSC, Articles 74 and 83). 
One important issue in this context is that once international boundaries are established they 
tend to stay where they are. Maritime boundaries do not change unless the parties in question 
agree. The 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties states that boundary treaties are 
excluded from  the  rule  that  a  party  to  a  treaty  may  invoke “a  fundamental change in 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
43 Prescott & Schofield (2005). 
44 IHO et al. (2006:18). 
2013.  
circumstances” as grounds for terminating a treaty.45 In other words, agreed maritime 
boundaries are fixed in terms of location, even if the baselines they are constructed from have 
shifted. 
 
The third option for defining the outer limits of maritime jurisdiction is through submission 
to a third party. An example in this context is provided by the definition of the outer limits of 
continental shelf areas located beyond 200 nm from baselines. In order that coastal states may 
confirm their sovereign rights over areas of continental shelf beyond 200 nm from their 
baselines, the LOSC provides that such states should make a submission regarding its 
proposed outer continental shelf limits mainly based on geological and geomorphologic 
evidence and submit this to the CLCS. The “continental shelf beyond 200 nm from baseline” 
is commonly termed the outer or extended continental shelf. Determining the outer limit of 
the continental shelf where it extends seawards of the 200 nm from baselines involves 
complicated procedures and significant resources. The procedure for the delineation of the 
outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nm was further specified by the CLCS in its 
Scientific and Technical Guidelines, which were adopted on 13 May 1999.46 Once the CLCS 
has delivered its recommendations to the coastal state that state may declare the outer limits 
of its outer continental shelf, which are “final and binding” when defined “on the basis of” 
the CLCS’s recommendations (LOSC, Article 76 (8)). In other words, even though the outer 
limit of the continental shelf is not definitive in terms of distance from baselines, unlike the 
outer limits of other zones, the limit is fixed in terms of its location once it has been properly 
established. 
 
From the three options to set the limits of maritime jurisdiction elaborated upon here, the first 
generates unfixed maritime limits, while the latter two establish fixed limits. The shifting 
maritime  limits  in  the  first  option  result  from  migrating  baselines,  especially  normal 
baselines. The inherent dynamism of the coast will inevitably lead to alterations in the 
location of baselines over time, and this in the present circumstances will necessarily lead to 
changes in the location of the outer limits of maritime claims. This situation is likely to be 
exacerbated by sea-level rise. In the second and third options, agreed maritime boundaries 
and outer limits of continental shelf beyond 200 nm are fixed. This highlights a growing 
desire on the part of threatened coastal states to fix baselines and the limits derived from 
them. It can be noted that the challenge of global sea-level rise was simply not contemplated 
during the drafting of the LOSC. The fact that, in accordance with the LOSC, some maritime 
 
 
 
45 Vienna  Convention  on  the  Law  of  Treaties,  Article  62(2a).  In  addition,  Article  11(a)  of  the  1978 
Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties provides that a change of states does 
not affect a boundary established by a treaty. 
46 The guidelines  are available  at 
http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/documents/Guidelines/CLCS_11.htm,    last   accessed   25   April 
2013.  
limits and boundaries should be fixed does, however, suggest that moving towards declaring 
and fixing maritime limits which are presently susceptible to change represents a plausible 
and reasonable response to an unanticipated problem. 
 
 
 
E.      Conclusions 
 
Sea-level rise has significant potential to have highly problematic effects not just in terms of 
the inundation of land territory, but also with respect to the extent of coastal state claims to 
maritime space. This chapter has explored some of the issues and uncertainties that arise in 
relation to the phenomenon of sea-level rise. It has also sought to highlight some of the ways 
in which the impacts of sea-level rise on claims to maritime jurisdiction are likely to be 
uneven. 
 
A  number  of  options  to  address  this  challenge  have  been  outlined.  While  physical 
intervention with a view to stabilising or fixing coastlines and baselines, and thus maritime 
limits, may work in certain circumstances and situations, the legal fixing of either or both 
baselines and limits may prove a more feasible solution. This can begin from coastal states 
unilaterally declaring or even depositing their normal baselines or maritime limits, analogous 
to the deposition of straight (LOSC, Article 16 (20)) or archipelagic (LOSC, Article 47 (9)) 
baselines. Once declared on an official chart, normal baselines can remain at the same 
location until the chart is revised. In addition, normal baselines are those identified “on large- 
scale charts officially recognised by the coastal State” (LOSC, Article 5) and are not 
necessarily representative of the actual location of coastlines. This supports the idea of fixing 
normal baselines by preserving charts assigned for the purpose of depicting baselines. 
Increasing state practice along these lines can be anticipated. 
 
A more radical approach to fixing baselines would be to amend the LOSC. However, this 
approach seems unlikely because, even though the LOSC contains amendment procedures, 
they have never been activated. Further, there appears to be scant enthusiasm for a Fourth 
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. Such discussion could nevertheless 
potentially take place through consultations in a technical forum, at least initially, such as the 
Advisory Board on the Law of the Sea (ABLOS).47 In line with this idea, a supplementary 
agreement to the LOSC, such as the fish stocks agreement of 1995,48  is conceivable. This 
 
 
 
47 Schofield (2009). 
48 United  Nations  (1995)  Agreement  for  the  Implementation  of the  Provisions  of the  United  Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management 
of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, adopted 4 August 1995, in force as from 
11   December    2001,   Geneva,    Switzerland:    United    Nations,    available    at   http://daccess-dds- 
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N95/274/67/PDF/N9527467.pdf?OpenElement,   last  accessed  25  April 
 
precedent could be used as a model in approaching the fixing of baselines and/or maritime 
limits. 
 
Fixing baselines and/or maritime limits is essentially aimed at preserving the existing rights 
of coastal states and it can be argued that this is hardly excessive. In addition, this effort is 
particularly important for small island states which have minimal responsibility for the 
emergence of the problems related to climate change. The Small Island Developing States 
(SIDS) have contributed least to the human-induced climate change that is causing sea-level 
rise, but are affected most by its impacts. It seems only equitable that such states should be 
able to fix their baselines and maritime limits to preserve their rights over their maritime 
zones and natural resources to which they are entitled. 
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